Battle of Preveza

For the battle of the Italo-Turkish War, see Battle of Preveza (1911).

Battle of Preveza
Part of the Third Ottoman–Venetian War
Battle of Preveza, Ohannes Umed Behzad
Date 28 September 1538 Location Near Preveza, Ionian Sea Result Ottoman victory
Belligerents
Ottoman Empire	Holy League Venice Papal States Genoa Spain Mantua Malta
Commanders and leaders
Hayreddin Pasha Sinan Reis Dragut Seydi Ali Reis	Andrea Doria Vincenzo Cappello Marco Grimani Ferrante Gonzaga
Strength
122 galleys and galliots 366 cannon 3,000 janissaries and 8,000 soldiers	112 galleys 50 galiots 140 barkas 2,500–2,594 cannon 60,000 soldiers
Casualties and losses
No ships lost 400 killed 800 wounded	13 ships lost 36 ships captured 3,000 prisoners

The Battle of Preveza (also known as Prevesa) was a naval engagement that took place on 28 September 1538 near Preveza in the Ionian Sea in northwestern Greece between an Ottoman fleet and that of a Holy League. The battle was an Ottoman victory which occurred in the same area in the Ionian Sea as the Battle of Actium in 31 BC. It was one of the three largest sea battles that took place in the sixteenth century Mediterranean, along with the Battle of Djerba and the Battle of Lepanto.

Background

In 1537, commanding a large Ottoman fleet, Hayreddin Barbarossa captured a number of Aegean and Ionian islands belonging to the Republic of Venice, namely Syros, Aegina, Ios, Paros, Tinos, Karpathos, Kasos, and Naxos, thus annexing the Duchy of Naxos to the Ottoman Empire. He then unsuccessfully besieged the Venetian stronghold of Corfu and ravaged the Spanish-held Calabrian coast in southern Italy.

In the face of this threat, Pope Paul III in February 1538 in assembled a ’’Holy League’’, comprising the Papal States, Habsburg Spain, the Republic of Genoa, the Republic of Venice, and the Knights of Malta, to confront Ottoman fleet under Barbarossa. Andrea Doria, the Genoese admiral in the service of Emperor Charles V was in overall command. The Papal fleet under Admiral Marco Grimani, Patriarch of Aquileia and the Venetian fleet under Vincenzo Capello arrived first. Andrea Doria joined them with the Spanish-Genoese fleet on 22 September 1538.

Prior to Doria's arrival, Grimani attempted to land troops near the Fortress of Preveza, but he retreated to Corfu after suffering a number of casualties in the ensuing encounter with Ottoman forces under Murat Reis. The Holy League assembled its fleet near the island of Corfu. Barbarossa was still at the island of Kos in the Aegean Sea at that time, but he soon arrived at Preveza with the rest of the Ottoman fleet, after capturing the island of Kefalonia on the way. Sinan Reis, one of his lieutenants, suggested landing troops at Actium on the Gulf of Arta near Preveza, an idea that Barbarossa initially opposed, but which later proved to be important in securing the Ottoman victory.

Previous movements

After locating Barbarroja, Doria stationed his armada on September 25 in front of the mouth of the gulf, where the two fleets observed each other. The situation of both armadas was a stalemate. Barbarossa could not come out of the gulf, as he would have been overwhelmed, but as the surrounding land was under Ottoman control, the Turk armada could wait comfortably. For his part, Doria would prevail in a direct battle, but he could not assault the gulf, whose mouth would have turned into a bottleneck for his ships. Also, the Genoese could not menuver freely with his sailing ships, in which artillery he trusted to, as increasingly adverse winds threatened to drive the ships into the hostile coast if they approached too much.

Gulf of Arta, showing the Christian fleet outside and the Ottoman fleet inside.

The only viable option for the Christians was to disembark their landing forces, eliminate the Ottoman artillery and install their own, turning the gulf against the Ottomans. They considered a plan, which would execute the Spanish Marine Infantry under the command of Francisco de Sarmiento and Álvaro de Sande, but it was ultimately discarded due to Grimani's previous failure and because their explorers found no ideal orography and weather to safely disembark. The Ottomans attempted to built additional fortifications, which was rejected by the Christian ships' artillery fire from the coast. This composed the only exchange for the next day, as both admirals were aware of their advantages and did not dare to commit a mistake.

Deployment of the opposing fleets.

During the night of 27 September, Doria ordered his fleet to sail off and head 30 miles south towards Sessola, near Leucade, where they would start raiding Lepanto and the nearby Turkish positions in order to force Barbarossa to come out. The Turk admiral did so immediately, bursting out of Arta and forming his fleet in Y-shaped formation. Barbarossa was in the center with Sinan Reis, Cafer Reis, Şaban Reis and his son Hasan Reis (later Hasan Pasha). Seydi Ali Reis commanded the left wing and Salih Reis commanded the right wing. Turgut Reis, accompanied by Murat Reis, Güzelce Mehmet Reis and Sadık Reis, commanded the rear wing. Turgut Reis was with 6 large galliots and the left wing was close to the shore.

Battle

Christian sources give out mutually incompatible accounts about the movements and intentions of Doria, Grimani and Capello during the battle. Venetian sources, which became the mainstream version due to their primacy and color, portray Doria as causing the defeat by his inaction, while Hispano-Genoese accounts blame Grimani and Capello for refusing to follow his battle plan.

Venetian account

Map showing the positions of fleets in the battle.

According to the Venetian accounts, the surprised Doria considered Barbarossa was still too close to the Ottoman-controlled shore and refrained from ordering to attack. Capello and Grimani disagreed and pressed to capitalize on the chance as swiftly as possible, and after three hours of parliament, Doria relented and ordered the galleys to turn north, where they would reunite with sailing ships. However, weather disrupted his strategy, as a lack of wind had caused the sailing ships to lag behind, giving Barbarossa the perfect chance to reach and envelope them without leaving himself the protection of the Ottoman shore. The captains urged to make haste and help the ships, which were being surrounded and boarded by more mobile Ottoman galleys.

Doria headed with the Christian galleys towards Barbarossa, intending to intrude between the Ottomans and the coast so the enemies would be trapped between the Christian galleys and the sailing ships. However, upon reaching the battle, he turned away from the action, apparently believing Barbarossa was still too close to the coast, and hoping to make himself a bait for Barbarossa to turn towards. The Turkish admiral understood his strategy and did not give chase. The excess of tactical maneuvering exasperated Capello and Grimani, who came to the extent of personally boarding Doria's flagship to beg him to give battle. However, the night fell without an attempt to engage by Doria, who repeated his feint twice without success before ordering all Christian vessels to escape next morning.

Spanish-Genoese account

A satellite view of Lefkada and the Gulf of Arta.

According to imperial sources, Doria ordered the fleet to be ready upon sighting Barbarossa finally leaving Arta. The Genoese admiral sent a messenger on a brigantine to call Grimani and Capello, communicating them his intention to attack and wanting to know their readiness, which they both confirmed. Grimani considered risky to engage Barbarossa frontally, but he claimed to be willing to do it. Doria then ordered the sailing ships to head for the Ottoman left wing, intending to cut them from the coast, and then the Venetian and Papal galleys to follow them even closer to the coast envelope any Ottoman attempt to do the same to the sailing ships. However, the Christian galleys did not move, despite Doria repeated his message thrice.

As the Ottoman galleys were already surrounding the sailing ships, the Genoese admiral dispatched the Spanish Viceroy of Sicily, Ferrante Gonzaga, in another brigantine to urge Capello and Grimani to follow his strategy. However, the allied captains replied evasively. Grimani had changed his mind and claimed he did not have superior orders from the Republic of Venice to engage in direct combat. Doria found himself only followed by nine allied galleys. He sailed around the formation calling the rest to reagroup, but many of them became entangled in the attempt to scramble, which would made them an easy prey had the sailing ships not been between Barbarossa and them. Rain started falling on them, and Doria ordered to retreat upon nightfall.

Fights

Machín de Munguía's vessel fighting in Preveza.

One way or another, the sailing ships were under attack. The huge Venetian flagship Candia or Galeone di Venezia, captained by Alessandro Condalmiero, had been left stranded 4 miles off the coast and 10 miles off Sessola. Condalmiero was surrounded by dozens of Ottoman galleys, which he initially fended off with the ship's heavy artillery, but Barbarossa's ships managed to position themselves on his ship's blind spots and pepper the Venetian ship, which Condalmiero attempted to turn around in order to present broadsides. The ship fought fiercely for the entire day waiting for galleys that never came, ending up damaged in the process, although ultimately managing to avoid being captured, even after Barbarossa's flagship joined the frey.

The Spanish and Genoese sailing ships also fought back by sheer firepower. The two main flagship, captained by Francisco Sarmiento and Juan Villegas de Figueroa, repulsed multiple Ottoman attacks. Figueroa was eventually boarded and overwhelmed, forcing his marine infantry to fight in a last stand, until the vessel received so much damage that it sank. Another ship captained by Machín de Munguía with another marine company faced another batch of dozens of Turkish galleys, becoming dismasted and severely damaged in the process, although ultimately escaping unboarded. In the rest of the sailing fleet, several ships fired back to the attackers, while in others, the crews lost hope of being helped and abandoned the ships.

By the end of the day, the Turks had sunk, destroyed or captured 128 ships and taken approximately 3,000 prisoners. The Turks did not lose any ships, but they suffered 400 dead and 800 wounded.

Aftermath

Dissension exploded within the Holy League due to their actions during the battle. Due to the long-standing enmity between Venice and Genoa, Capello accused Doria of sabotaging the battle in order not to risk the Hispano-Genoese ships and preserve them for future operations outside the League, while leaving the ships of Venice, his home city's fierce rival and the primary target of Ottoman aggression at that time, to be destroyed. Chroniclers echoed especially that Doria had inexplicably not attacked despite having a superior fleet. Sephardic scholar Joseph ha-Kohen even proposed that God had confounded Doria's mind as a punishment for mistreating Jewish prisoners in his campaigns.

Nicolò Zen the Younger wrote his History of the War between Venice and the Turks which primarily consisted of an invective against those who had called for the war against the Ottomans in which they had behaved so ingloriously. The text was not published but a manuscript of it was circulated in his household and survived and is now held by the Biblioteca Marciana.

By Doria's insistence, the Holy League continued the campaign and captured the fortress of Castelnuovo, present day Herceg Novi, Montenegro, hoping for it to become the beach head of an invasion of the Ottoman Balkans. However, Spaniards and Venetians quarreled again about who would garrison Castelnuovo. To ease tensions, Charles V offered Venice the fortress permanently, but the Venetians rejected the offer, claiming to lack means to defend it. The Republic had already started negotiations with the Ottomans. Barbarossa would launch an expedition to recover the fortress the following year, leading to the famed Siege of Castelnuovo. He captured almost all the remaining Christian outposts in the Ionian and Aegean Seas.

In October 1540, a peace treaty was signed between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, under which the Turks gained control of the Venetian possessions in the Peloponnese and Dalmatia and the former Venetian islands in the Aegean, Ionian and Eastern Mediterranean sea. Venice also had to pay a war compensation of 300,000 ducats in gold to the Ottoman Empire.

With the victory at Preveza and the subsequent victory at the Battle of Djerba in 1560, the Ottomans were able to repel the efforts of Venice and Spain, the two main rival powers in the Mediterranean. Ottoman superiority in large-scale fleet battles in the Mediterranean remained unchallenged until the Battle of Lepanto in 1571.

Sources

• Crowley, Roger (2008). Empires of the Sea: The Final Battle for the Mediterranean 1521–1580. Faber & Faber. ISBN 978-0571232314.
• Fernández Duro, Cesáreo (1895). Armada Española, desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y Aragón, tomo I. Instituto de Historia Naval.
• Hattendorf, John; King, Ernest (2013). Naval Strategy and Power in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-136-71317-0. Retrieved 25 November 2015.
• Lane-Pool, Stanley (1890). The Barbary Corsairs. Fisher Unwin.

External links

• Battle of Preveza (1538) – An in-depth analysis